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Abstract 
Global warming and Climate change are now widely recognized as two of the most important 
issues facing human society. Thus, the determinants of CO2 emissions have attracted many 
researchers over the past few decades. One of the important factors is the democracy level of 
a country. Most of studies, however, ignore the possibility that effect of democracy on CO2 
emissions could vary throughout the CO2 emissions distribution. In this paper, we address this 
issue by applying panel quantile regression methods. Our results show that the effect of 
democracy on CO2 emissions is higher heterogeneous across conditional distribution of 
pollution. The coefficient is highly significant and has the positive sign at lower quantiles. Yet 
the magnitude decreases toward the higher quantiles and then it becomes insignificant. 
However, it turns into negative and becomes significant again at the higher quantile. In 
addition, financial openness is not statistically significant at any quantile. These novel 
findings not only help advance the existing literature, but also can be of special interest to 
policy makers. 
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1. Introduction 
Global warming has emerged as one of the most challenges facing human society. 
Greenhouse gas emissions (GHGs), especially carbon dioxide emissions, are considered as a 
dominant contributor to global warming. Global warming now presents the greatest potential 
threat to climate change. These increasing environmental threats have led scholars and policy 
makers to debate over reducing greenhouse gases emissions to alleviate global warming. 
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 Many countries have signed the Kyoto Protocol and attempted to decrease greenhouse gas 
emission to hinder global warming. This in turn calls for a clear identification of the major 
determinants of CO2 emissions. 
Following the seminal work of Grossman and Krueger (1995), a large literature has 
investigated the relationship between the measure of environmental degradation (such as per 
capita CO2 emissions) and per capita income under the name of the environmental Kuznets 
curve (EKC). The EKC hypothesis indicates that environmental degradation initially 
exaggerates when a country’s per capita income is low, as the economy grows, environmental 
degradation falls. This results in an inverted U-shaped relationship between environmental 
degradation and income. Thus, it is important to test the validity of the ECK hypothesis when 
designing appropriate policy tools for fighting against global warming and protecting the 
environment. 
Empirical evidence regarding the EKC hypothesis for CO2 is mixed, as some studies find 
a linear relationship between CO2 emissions and per capita GDP, others reveal an inverted-U 
relationship, and yet others find an N-shaped relationship1. Several reasons may explain the 
great discrepancies: the sample used for analysis, the model and the method employed to 
estimate the relationship, and the control variables included in the model (Zanin and Marra, 
2012; Esteve and Tamarit, 2012). While previous empirical studies examine the impact of per 
capita GDP on per capita emissions, research on the effect of institutional quality is relatively 
little. More specifically, researchers have usually investigated the determinants of pollution 
under the STIRPAT (Stochastic Impacts by Regression on Population, Affluence, and 
Technology) framework (Poumanyvong and Kaneko, 2010; Zhu et al., 2012). The STIRPAT 
model could be used to assess not only the core components, population size and affluence, 
on environmental impact, but also other factors like modernization on the environment (York 
et al., 2003). Martínez-Zarzoso et al. (2007) proxy technology with the share of industry in 
GDP and energy intensity. Shi (2003) employs the share of industry in GDP and the share of 
service in GDP as a proxy. In addition, a few studies considered trade openness as additional 
important variable (Managi et al., 2009; Tsurumi and Managi, 2011).  
However, many scholars argue that the relationship between environmental quality and 
income is not formed in isolation from political institutions that related to the process of 
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 environmental policy making in a country. For example, Dasgupta and Maler (1995) have 
argued that “The connection between environmental protection and civil and political rights is 
a close one. As a general rule, political and civil liberties are instrumentally powerful in 
protecting the environmental resource base, at least when compared with the absence of such 
liberties in countries run by authoritarian regimes”. Therefore, many studies have included 
the related political variables in the income-pollution relationship (Torras and Boyce, 1998; 
Barrett and Graddy, 2000). 
More recently, some attention has been paid to the relationship between the institutional 
quality (e.g., democracy) and pollution. Romuald (2011) argues that many environmental 
problems can be explained by institutional failure and bad government methods. Goel et al., 
(2013) argue that many policies have been implemented to influence (directly or indirectly) 
economic agents to internalize environmental externalities. A key factor behind the success of 
these policies is the institutional quality of a country. In this context of the literature, some 
researchers have been paid to the democracy-pollution nexus and some researchers have 
assessed the effect of political freedom on pollution. The results of such studies are, however, 
contradictory.  
Financial openness may also play a significant role in reducing environmental pollution 
(Tamazian and Rao, 2010; Tamazian et al., 2009; Jalil and Feridun, 2011). However, research 
on financial openness and its effects on pollution is more recent, and in relative infancy. Thus, 
our contribution is complementary to this research. We add to the extant literature by: (a) 
including a broader set of democracy to test the effects of democracy on pollution; (b) by 
including financial openness, we test the joint importance of democracy and financial 
openness on pollution. Brune and Guisinger (2003) show that a positive impact of democratic 
on financial openness. Similarly, Kirch and Terra (2012) argue that financial decisions may be 
strongly influenced by the institutional quality of a country. Quinn (2000) acknowledges the 
possibility of reverse causality from financial liberalization to democratic reversals. Given the 
relationship between democracy and financial openness, if one or both constructs are 
misrepresented in the model, there is a substantial likelihood that the coefficient of one 
variable is contaminated by another variable. In order to address this concern, we include both 
democracy factor and financial openness factor ; (c) by employing a quantile regression 
model with panel data, notably developed by Koenker (2004), we extend the earlier analysis 
 by looking the impact of democracy not only on the mean but also on the shape of the 
conditional distribution of environmental pollution. At present, only a few, albeit important 
papers, have applied panel quantile regression fixed effect model to investigate the 
relationship between income and pollution (Damette and Delacote, 2012; Flores et al., 2013; 
Yaduma et al., 2013)2. This method allows us to derive different parameter estimates for 
various conditional quantiles of pollution. Furthermore, quantile regressions model with fixed 
effects improve the usual cross-sectional or panel pooled data regressions by exploring 
simultaneously two kinds of heterogeneity: unobserved individual heterogeneity via fixed 
effects and common heterogeneity via covariates effects within the panel quantile estimation 
(Damette and Delacote, 2012). To test the robustness of our results, we also employ the 
method proposed by Canay (2011) to estimate the panel quantile regression model. To the 
best of our knowledge, no paper investigates the joint role of economic, financial and 
democracy variables on CO2 emissions in the panel quantile regression model framework. 
From a policy perspective, it is more interesting to understand what happens at the extremes 
of a distribution. For example, Chestnut et al., (1991) argue that both humans and ecosystems 
are more seriously affected at high concentrations of pollutions. Hence, it is important to learn 
about the behavior of emissions at high levels of pollution. In the type of consideration, the 
focus is no longer on the mean effect, but on the full distribution of pollution emissions.     
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 of the paper we review 
previous literature while Section 3 outlines the methodology used within this paper. Section 4 
we describe the data used in this paper. The empirical results of panel quantile regression 
models are presented in Section 5. Section 6 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Literature review 
There are a number of studies that investigate the link between institutional quality and 
pollution. On the whole, this branch of research can be categorized into two strands. The first 
strand of the literature investigates the democracy-environmental pollution nexus. The second 
strand of the literature examines the corruption-environmental pollution nexus. In this paper 
we mainly focus on the democracy-environmental pollution nexus. Some theorists believe 
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 that democracy can improve the environmental quality of a country, while others argue that 
may not improve the environmental quality or may even worsen it. Empirically, the results are 
mixed. The studies by Torras and Boyce (1998), Barrett and Graddy (2000), Li and Reuveny 
(2006), and Farzin and Bond (2006) argue that democratization makes citizens better 
informed and better enabled to protest. Torras and Boyce (1998) find that democracy, proxied 
by the Freedom House indicators of political rights and civil liberties in 1995, has in general a 
positive and significant effect on environmental quality, especially in low-income countries. 
Harbaugh et al. (2002) find there exist a consistent negative relationship between sulphur 
dioxide and the democracy level of a country. Using a panel data model over the 1980–1998 
period, Farzin and Bond (2006) find evidence that the country’s level of democracy (based on 
Polity IV data) and its associated freedoms is related positively to environmental quality. 
Using a panel dataset of 107 cities in 42 countries over the period 1971-1996, Bernauer and 
Koubi (2009) find that democracies and especially presidential systems have a positive effect 
on air quality.  
   However, several scholars find that democracy may not improve the environmental 
quality or may even worsen it (Midlarsky, 1998; Roberts and Parks, 2007; Scruggs, 1998). 
For example, Roberts and Parks (2007) conclude that democracy has almost no impact on 
carbon emissions. Scruggs (1998) also find an insignificant relationship between democracy 
level and three environmental indicators (dissolved oxygen demand, fecal coliform, 
particulates emissions), once income inequality is included. Nevertheless, Midlarsky (1998) 
finds that a higher democracy level is associated with a worse environmental performance. 
The author argues that democratic governments may not be responsive to environmental 
imperatives because some groups are expected to lose (or gain) more than others when 
environmental policies are implemented.  
Though many literature concerned with the relationship between democracy and 
environmental quality, it is safe to say that extant empirical evidence on democracy-pollution 
nexus is mixed. We argue that the main shortcoming of these studies is that the result may be 
biased due to neglect the distributional heterogeneity. In addition, only a few studies explicitly 
assess the impact of financial openness on pollution (Tamazian and Rao, 2010; Tamazian et 
al., 2009; Jalil and Feridun, 2011). Frankel and Rose (2005) argue that openness is at least as 
likely to help the environment as to hurt it. Therefore, such an improvement in financial 
 infrastructure (based on the openness of capital account) may contribute to the efficient 
technological use and, therefore affect the environmental degradation as well (Tamazian et al., 
2009). So far we have found little empirical work to establish the relationships between 
democracy, financial openness, and environmental pollution accounting for distributional 
heterogeneity. To achieve insight into the unobserved individual heterogeneity and 
distributional heterogeneity, a further study on the impact of democracy on pollution with 
panel quantile regression with fixed effect model is necessary.  
 
3. Methodology 
In this paper we employ the panel quantile model with fixed effect to investigate the 
impact of economic, financial openness, and democracy on environmental quality. While the 
usual regressions focus on the mean, quantile regression is able to describe the entire 
conditional distribution of the dependent variable (emissions). Using this methodology, we 
are able to assess the determinants of emissions throughout the conditional distribution, with 
particular focus on the most and least emissions countries-those that arguably of the most 
interest. Quantile regression can therefore help us obtain a more complete picture of the 
factors affecting emissions. Indeed, focusing on the mean effects may under- or overestimate 
the relevant coefficient estimates, or may even fail to detect important relationships (Binder 
and Coad, 2011). 
Quantile regressions, first introduced in the seminal paper by Koenker and Bassett (1978), 
is a generalization of median regression analysis to other quantiles. The  th quantile of the 
conditional distribution is estimated by solving: 
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From (1) we can see that quantile regression can be seen to be a weighted regression. For 
example, if 6.0 , the negative residuals will have less weight than the positive ones. Thus, 
unlike standard regression estimator, quantile regression estimators are robust to outliers and 
 distributions with heavy tails. It is worth mentioning that segmenting the dependent variable 
into subsets according to its unconditional distribution and then running an OLS on these 
subsets is not an appropriate alternative to the quantile regression, due to severe sample 
selection problems (Koenker and Hallock, 2001). 
   Quantile regression is first introduced as a cross-sectional estimator (Koenker and Bassett, 
1978). However, these estimators do not take into account unobserved country heterogeneity. 
To combine the advantages of quantile regression model with panel data, there has been little 
but growing work have focused on the econometric theory of applying quantile regression to 
panel data contexts, such as Koenker (2004), Lamarche (2010), Galvao and Montes-Rojas 
(2010), Galvao (2011) and Canay (2011). Consider panel quantile regression model with fixed 
effects as 
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The main problem with panel quantile regression with fixed effect is that the inclusion of a 
large number of fixed effects ( i ) lparameter incidental parameters problem. The estimator 
will be inconsistent when the number of cross-sectional units goes to infinity while the 
number of observations for each cross-sectional unit is fixed (Kato and Galvao, 2010). The 
standard demeaning (or differencing) approachs to eliminate unobserved fixed effects is 
unfeasible in the quantile regression model. These methods rely on the fact that expectations 
are linear operators, which is not the case for conditional quantiles (Canay, 2011). That is also 
the main reason why the literature about panel quantile regression with fixed effect is 
relatively little. 
  Koenker (2004) proposes a method (called shrinkage method) to deal with such problem. 
The author treats unobservable fixed effect as parameters to be jointly estimated with the 
covariate effects for different quantiles. Specifically, parameter estimators are obtained by 
solving the following expression: 
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where kw  is the relative weight given to the k -th quantile, which controls for the 
contribution of the k -th quantile on the estimation of the fixed effects. In this paper we 
employ equally weighted quantiles Kwk /1 (Lamarche, 2011; Alexander et al., 2011).   is 
the tuning parameter that shrinks the individual effects toward zero to improve the 
 performance of the estimate of  . For the term   goes to zero, the penalty term disappears 
and we obtain the usual fixed effect estimator, while the term goes to infinite, we obtain the 
estimate of the model without the individual effects (Pooled model). In this paper we set 1  
as Damette and Delacote (2012) and Lee et al., (2012). To check the robustness of our results, 
we also conduct sensitivity analysis with different value of . 
   Canay (2011) finds that Koenker’s method is computationally intensive and the author 
develops a two-step method of estimating panel quantile regression model with fixed effects. 
Canay proposes a simple transformation of the data that eliminates the individual fixed effects 
under the assumption that these effects are location shifters (fixed effects are constant across 
quantiles). Given this assumption, Canay develops the following two-step procedure. First, 
estimates the standard fixed effect panel data model at the conditional mean and then 
employing the estimated parameters to obtain the individual fixed effect iˆ . Second, subtracts 
this component from the dependent variable ( iitit yy ˆ

) and proceeds using the standard 
method of estimation of quantile regression. Furthermore, the bootstrap method is employed 
to obtain the variance–covariance matrix for this estimator3. The bootstrap method is based on 
randomly drawn samples (with replacement) of size NT from the original data. For each of 
these B draws, the two-step estimator as described above is computed and resulting in B 
different estimates for Bbkbbb ,,1,))(ˆ,),(ˆ()(ˆ
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1
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In this paper we study the effect of democracy on environmental quality by modifying the 
specification of previous studies to account for heterogeneity throughout the pollution 
distribution. We specify the conditional quantile function for quantile  (such as the 
10th,20th,…, 90th, 95th percentiles) as follow 
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 where the countries are indexed by i  and time by t . ity  is emissions indicator and we 
using per capita CO2 emissions (metric tons per capita); GDP is measured by the GDP per 
capita; POP denotes population size; TRADE represents trade openness, proxied by exports 
plus imports as a percentage of GDP; INDUS is the share of industry sector in GDP; Kaopen 
is collected from Chinn and Ito (2008); democ is democracy indicator and we use polity 
meansure (Polity2) and Freedom House Political Rights Index and Civil Liberties Index (see 
section 4 for details). Depending on the democracy indicator used, the sample size is 87 and 
97 countries4. 
 
4. Data description and analysis 
In this paper we attempt to investigate the relationship between democracy, financial 
openness, and environmental quality using data from a cross-section of countries over the 
time span from 1985-2005. The choice of sample selected for this analysis is primarily 
dictated by the availability of reliable data. The dependent variable in this analysis is CO2 
emissions. As mentioned earlier, CO2 emissions are considered as the primary greenhouse gas 
responsible for global warming (IPCC, 2007). Our source of CO2 emission data is the World 
Bank (2013). Next, we will discuss the main explanatory variables chosen for our analysis, as 
well as control variables.  
Our main variable of interest is democracy. Buitenzorgy and Mol (2011) point out that 
democracy is not an easy variable to measure. The most widely used democracy indices for 
measuring the democracy level of a country are the Polity index (Marshall and Jaggers, 2012) 
and the Freedom House index (Freedom House, 2011). We use a broad array of democracy 
measures in this paper. The first democracy variable used is the aggregate indicator of 
democracy from the Polity IV database (polity2) (Marshall and Jaggers, 2012). This variable 
captures the regime authority spectrum on a 21-point scale ranging from −10 (fully 
non-democratic) to +10 (fully democratic). As a robustness check, an alternative measure of 
democracy is used. The second democracy is the Freedom House Political Rights Index and 
Civil Liberties Index, which assigns a numerical value to each country on a scale of 1–7, 
where 1 indicating the highest degree of freedom and 7 the lowest degree of freedom. For the 
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 purpose of simplifying the interpretation, the Freedom House Political Rights Index is 
reversed (by subtracting each value from 8) so that 7 now represents the highest level of 
democracy and 1 the lowest level. We use a simple sum of these two indices as a proxy for the 
aggregate democracy level. 
  To measure financial openness, we use the Chinn and Ito (2008) index (so called kaopen 
index), which is one of the most commonly used indices in the literature. This index is 
constructed based on the data from the IMF Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and 
Exchange Restrictions (AREAER). It ranges between−2. 66 (full capital controls) and 2.66 
(complete liberalization). 
  Because the relationship between environmental quality and democracy can be affected by 
other factors, it is desirable to adopt a multivariate approach to avoid an omitted variable bias. 
According to the previous literature, a vector of additional explanatory variables included in 
the model. These include trade openness, population size, and the share of industry in the 
country's GDP, as it is common in the EKC literature. Trade openness is measured by the ratio 
of annual imports plus exports to GDP. Population size is the total population of a country. 
These variables capture the economic and demographic structure of countries which are 
expected to influence their pollution profile. These three variables collected form WDI (2013). 
Aside from these variables, we also include country dummies and year dummies. The 
justification for adding country dummies notes that they account for any remaining 
time-invariant country specific variation is not captured by our measure of main variables, 
whose omission could bias the estimates in a typical cross-sectional study. Finally, year 
dummies are used in order to control for common time shocks to all countries. Following the 
standard practice, all the variables enter the regression in natural log form except democracy, 
financial openness as well as country and time dummies. Details about the data and its 
sources are provided in Table 1. 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
Table 2 presents an overview of the descriptive statistics and pairwise correlations 
between our main variables of interest. The histograms showing the distribution of CO2 
emissions are shown in Fig. 1. Clearly, the distribution of CO2 is skewed. In heterogeneous 
distribution, the OLS regression estimates the mean effect of the independent variables on 
dependent variable might seriously under- or over-estimate effects or even fail to identify 
 effects at all (Cade and Noon, 2003). A solution to such problem is to employ the quantile 
regressions method instead of OLS regressions (Koenker and Bassett, 1978). Quantile 
regressions method makes it possible to analyze effects of the independent variables on 
different quantiles of the pollution distribution instead of focus on the mean of the distribution. 
In addition, the method is robust to outlier and gives the researcher a more complete picture 
of the effects of the independent variables on the dependent variable (Binder and Coad, 2011). 
While the quantile regressions are starting to be recognized as a helpful technique in the case 
of skewed distributions in other fields of economics, there are relative few studies that have 
applied it in the area of environmental science (Flores et al., 2013). We therefore use a 
quantile regression model to estimate the relationship between environmental quality and 
democracy in the following section. 
                           [Insert Table 2 about here] 
                           [Insert Fig.1 about here  ] 
5. Empirical results 
  In this section we report and discuss our empirical results. As a benchmark, we first present 
pooled and fixed effects OLS regression estimates. Second, we focus on the main results of 
this paper, with an eye toward shedding light on the question: whether the effect of 
democracy and financial openness on pollution heterogeneous along quantiles of the 
conditional distribution of pollution. Finally, we discuss our robustness checks, showing 
whether our empirical results vary according to alternative estimation procedures and 
alternative model specifications. 
 
5.1 Main results 
Before estimating the panel quantile regression models, we test whether the variables used 
are stationary. The results show that all the variables are stationary in levels5. Therefore, we 
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(0.0003), -7.3499(0.0000), -1.4834 (0.0690), -4.4030 (0.0000), -12.5368 (0.0000) and -3.6471 (0.0001), 
respectively; 97 countries with Freedom House measure, the t-bars (P value) of Im et al., (2003) (IPS) test are 
-4.7746 (0.0000), -3.8590 (0.0001), -7.6522 (0.0000), -2.4064 (0.0081),-4.7765 (0.0000),-1.3917 (0.0820) and 
-3.9282 (0.0000), respectively. Linear trend term included. The maximum lag lengths are set to 5 and Schwarz 
 proceed with panel quantile regression model. 
   To facilitate a comparison, the model is estimated first by pooled and fixed effects OLS 
regression estimates. Columns 1 and 2 in Table 3 present the pooled and one-way individual 
fixed effects OLS regression estimates, respectively. Most variables tend to increase and 
decrease together in different regions over time (e.g. along the business cycle). As pointed by 
Baltagi (2008), time-period fixed effects control for all time specific, spatial-invariant 
variables whose omission could bias the estimates in a typical time series study. Thus, we 
focus our discussion on the results with respect to the model with two-way fixed effect. To 
control for such effect, Columns 3 reports the results of two-way fixed effects. The mixed 
results from these model specifications are in line with previous findings. Only the effect of 
income is consistent across specifications. 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
  To control for the distributional heterogeneity, quantile regression with fixed effects of 
Koenker (2004) is used. As indicated above, omission time-period fixed effects could bias the 
estimates in a typical time series study. This is the source of motivation for our focus on 
quantile regression analysis with two-way fixed effect. Table 4 presents our panel quantile 
regression estimation results regarding the impact of two measures of democracy, Polity IV 
measure and Freedom House measure, on pollution for the 1985-2005 period, respectively. 
The results are reported for the 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80, 90, 95th percentiles of the 
conditional pollution distribution. The standard errors for the quantile estimates are obtained 
by bootstrapping approach. From Panel (A) of Table 4, we can see that the impact of 
democracy on pollution is highly heterogeneous. There is some pronounced differences across 
different percentiles in the conditional distribution of pollution. The coefficient is highly 
significant and has the positive sign at lower quantiles.Yet the magnitude decreases toward 
the higher quantiles. At the 60th quantile it becomes insignificant and then turns into negative 
and becomes significant again at the 95th quantile. 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
Nevertheless, the coefficient of democracy is significant and positive in the OLS mean 
                                                                                                                                                              
Bayesian Criterion is used to determine the optimal lag length. 
 regression with two-way fixed effect. One possible explanation is that our results are 
corrected for distributional heterogeneity, which might decreases the likelihood of under- or 
overestimate the relevant coefficient estimates. Also, the results provide evidence for our 
claim that OLS mean regression only provides an incomplete picture about the effect of 
democracy on pollution. Our results indicate that democracy is negatively related to pollution 
for the 95th percentile, imply that higher democracy level appear to represent an incentive for 
environmental protect in high pollution countries. With respect to the main focus of this paper, 
financial openness is not statistically significant at various percentiles. Therefore, this cannot 
support the hypothesis that the degree of financial openness of a country is associated with 
pollution. From the later discussion we can conclude that this result is robust to different 
specifications. 
Results for other control variables included in the model are also informative. We can 
conclude that the effect of income (per capita GDP) and population size are consistent across 
quantiles. Greater economic prosperity and larger population size lead to higher pollution 
emissions. Thus, the results suggest little evidence of heterogeneity in the effects of GDP and 
population size on pollution, though the marginal impact is differenct across conditional 
distributional of pollution. The coefficient on the share of industry in GDP is insignificant for 
10th and 20th percentiles but positive and significant for the other percentiles. It is 
worthwhile noting that the marginal impact of this variable increases for high pollution 
countries. The impact of trade openness is positive, although insignificant at various 
percentiles. That is to say that we do not find any significant effect of trade openness on 
pollution. To sum up, we find that, on average, the control variables are largely similar to 
those when using OLS in terms of sign.  
In the analysis above, we use the Polity IV database measure of democracy (Marshall and 
Jaggers, 2012). As a robustness check, we use an alternative measure of democracy, compiled 
annually by Freedom House based on an assessment of political rights and civil liberties. 
Panel (B) of Table 4 reports the results of estimating Eq. (6) using alternative democracy 
variable, taken from the Freedom House index (Freedom House, 2011). The results are largely 
similar to Table 3. The impact of democracy on pollution is highly heterogeneous. Financial 
openness is found to statistically insignificant. The effects of economic prosperity and 
population size are consistent throughout the conditional distribution of pollution. We find 
 that economic prosperity and population size have a strong and positive impact on pollution 
emissions. 
 
5.2 Robustness checks 
In order to test the validity of our results, we conduct a series of robustness checks in the 
following section. These include considering: (i) an alternative estimation technique; (ii) 
nonlinearities in the effect of GDP; (iii) different values for  .(iv) Alternative model 
specification. 
5.2.1. Alternative estimation techniques 
  In the main analysis above, we use the estimation method proposed by Koenker (2004). In 
this section we investigate whether our findings are affected by different estimation 
techniques. We report the results of Canay (2011) method in Table 5. We find that the impact 
of democracy on pollution is higher heterogeneous. Financial openness is found to 
statistically insignificant at various quantiles of the conditional distribution. Among these 
additional controls, we find that economic prosperity and population size have a positive and 
statistically significant impact on pollution, largely consistent with the above findings. 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
5.2.2. Nonlinearities in the effect of GDP 
  To account for possible nonlinear relationship between economic prosperity and pollution, 
we include GDP squared term in the explanatory variables set. The corresponding regression 
results are reported in Table 6. As the results of Table 6 demonstrate, population size 
significantly positively correlated with pollution. Coefficient of Financial openness is 
insignificant throughout the distribution. More importantly, the impact of democracy on 
pollution also is higher heterogeneous, consistent with the above findings. This gives us 
confidence that it is vital to take into account distributional heterogeneous of pollution. 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
5.2.3. Different values for    
Next, we investigate whether our findings are robustness to different . We experiment 
with different values of   range from 0.1 to 1.5. The control variables are largely similar to 
those when using  =1. To save space, We only report the main variables of interest. The 
 results are reported in Table 7 and Table 8. The findings are almost consistent with those from 
panel quantile regression results with  =1. 
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
5.2.4. Alternative model specification 
  Up to this point, all the regression results provided above have included both democracy 
and financial openness. Brune and Guisinger (2003) show that a positive impact of 
democratic on financial openness. Similarly, Kirch and Terra (2012) argue that financial 
decisions may be strongly influenced by the institutional quality of a country. Quinn (2000) 
acknowledges the possibility of reverse causality from financial liberalization to democratic 
reversals. Given the relationship between democracy and financial openness, if one or both 
constructs are misrepresented in the model, there is a substantial likelihood that the coefficient 
of one variable is contaminated by another variable. Therefore, we run two other model 
specifications. Specification I includes only democracy level and specification II includes 
only financial openness. As the results of Table 9 and Table 10 demonstrate, the findings are 
similar to the model specification include both factors. 
[Insert Table 9 about here] 
[Insert Table 10 about here] 
Overall, the results from these various robustness checks largely support the robustness of 
the previous findings. The effect of democracy is higher heterogeneous across different 
percentiles in the conditional distribution of pollution. Our finding that financial openness is 
not statistically significant at any quantile. Coefficients for other control variables are similar 
to the results reported above and do not seem to be sensitive to a particular estimation 
procedure, an alternative measure of democracy. Thus, we conclude that the results reported 
in this paper are robust 
 
6. Conclusions 
The objective of this study is to explore the impact of democracy on pollution using the 
panel quantile regression model, which takes into consideration unobserved individual 
 heterogeneity and distributional heterogeneity. Quantile regression model can obtain a full 
picture of the relationship between pollution and democracy across the whole distribution of 
the former, not just for its mean value. While the democracy-pollution nexus have drawn 
economists' interest in recent years, the main contribution of this study is to examine the 
sensitivity of the democracy-pollution nexus to the conditional distribution of pollution. Also, 
we believe that quantile regression model can help us obtain a more complete picture of the 
factors affecting emissions. 
   In general, we find that economic prosperity and population size have a positive and 
significant effect on pollution. We do not find any significant effect of trade openness on 
pollution. Our most important finding, however, is that the impact of democracy on pollution 
is not uniform across conditional distribution of pollution. The coefficient is highly significant 
and has the positive sign at lower quantiles. Yet the magnitude decreases toward the higher 
quantiles and then it becomes insignificant. However, it turns into negative and becomes 
significant again at the higher quantile. This gives the insights that the democracy-pollution 
nexus may have been not fully studied in previous studies that focused on mean effects. 
Another key implication of our findings is that financial openness has not significant effect on 
pollution at any quantile. Our main findings are generally robust when the alternative 
estimation methods and alterntvie model specifications are employed. 
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 Table 1 
Variable definitions and data sources. 
Variable Definition Source 
CO2  Carbon dioxide emissions (metric tons per capita) World Development Indicators, 2013
d 
GDP GDP per capita (constant 2005 US$) World Development Indicators, 2013 
POP Population size World Development Indicators, 2013 
TRADE Ratio of imports plus exports to GDP World Development Indicators, 2013 
INDUS The share of industry in GDP World Development Indicators, 2013 
Polity2 The difference between the sub-indexes for democracy and autocracy  Marshall and Jaggers (2012) a 
Freedom Sum of the Freedom House Political Rights and Civil Liberties Indices Freedom House (2011) b 
Kaopen Financial openness measuring the extent of openness in capital account transactions Chinn and Ito (2008) c 
Notes: All the data are annually over 1995-2005. 
a. http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/inscr.htm 
b. www.freedomhouse.org/ ratings/index.htm 
c. http://web.pdx.edu/~ito/Chinn-Ito_website.htm 
d. http://data.worldbank.org/indicator 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 2  
Summary statistics                                     
 Mean S.D. Min Q1(.25) Median Q3(.75) Max (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
(A) Polity measure 
(1) CO2  0.23 1.77 -4.48 -1.27 0.48 1.80 3.18 1.00       
(2)GDP 8.41 1.29 5.57 7.27 8.40 9.50 10.77 0.93 1.00      
(3) POP 16.24 1.72 12.65 15.16 16.17 17.45 20.99 0.14 0.05 1.00     
(4)TRADE 4.08 0.58 2.38 3.74 4.07 4.41 6.06 0.21 0.22 -0.56 1.00    
(5) INDUS 3.32 0.39 1.97 3.13 3.36 3.54 4.55 0.58 0.51 0.14 0.25 1.00   
(6)Kaopen 0.01 1.52 -1.86 -1.17 -0.38 1.38 2.44 0.52 0.61 0.06 0.19 0.14 1.00  
(7) Polity2 2.80 6.99 -10.00 -5.00 6.00 9.00 10.00 0.45 0.51 0.11 -0.002 0.10 0.39 1.00 
(b) Freedom House measure         
(1) CO2  0.28 1.70 -4.48 -1.03 0.50 1.75 3.18 1.00       
(2) GDP 8.48 1.26 5.57 7.41 8.62 9.59 10.77 0.93 1.00      
(3) POP 15.82 2.10 11.03 14.74 16.05 17.27 20.99 0.04 -0.09 1.00     
(4) TRADE 4.14 0.59 2.38 3.80 4.14 4.51 6.06 0.22 0.25 -0.60 1.00    
(5) INDUS 3.29 0.39 1.97 3.05 3.34 3.52 4.55 0.55 0.46 0.21 0.19 1.00   
(6) Kaopen -0.01 1.50 -1.86 -1.17 -0.11 1.21 2.44 0.51 0.58 0.05 0.16 0.13 1.00  
(7) Freedom 9.18 3.96 2.00 5.00 10.00 13.00 14.00 0.53 0.62 -0.14 0.13 0.10 0.41 1.00 
All the variables are in natural log form, expect Kaopen, Polity2 and Freedom. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Table 3 
OLS regression results 
 OLS pooled OLS one-way fixed effect OLS two-way fixed effect 
(a) Polity measure (N=2037) 
GDP 1.2415***(69.2511) 1.0565***(32.8938) 1.1527***(31.6530) 
TRADE 0.2043***(6.2640) -0.0205(-0.7012) 0.0170(0.5620) 
POP 0.1249***(11.6981) -0.0607(-1.2050) 0.3342***(3.5145) 
INDUS 0.4285***(9.1288) 0.1127***(3.6417) 0.0411(1.2195) 
Kaopen -0.0616***(-5.0503) -0.0053(-0.7898) 0.0014(0.1968) 
Polity2 -0.0050**(-2.0927) 0.0039**(2.5448) 0.0039**(2.4851) 
Constant -14.4858***(-53.7634) -7.9756***(-10.4990) -15.0139***(-9.3355) 
 (b) Freedom House measure (N=2037) 
GDP 1.2425***(71.1716) 1.0671***(35.7471) 1.1045***(31.2786) 
TRADE 0.1901***(6.2444) -0.0148(-0.5347) -0.0085(-0.3019) 
POP 0.1063***(12.1572) -0.0622(-1.3048) 0.0389(0.4432) 
INDUS 0.4137***(9.5397) 0.1260***(4.1961) 0.1032***(3.1605) 
Kaopen -0.0503***(-4.5269) -0.0081(-1.2621) -0.0084(-1.2643) 
Freedom -0.0094**(-2.2059) 0.0052(1.5821) 0.0056*(1.7048) 
Constant -14.0060***(-58.9673) -8.1913***(-11.8953) -10.0395***(-6.8941) 
t values in parentheses.* indicate statistical significance at 10%; ** indicate significance at 5% and *** indicate significance at 1%. 
 
 
 Table 4 
Quantile regression results based on Koenker (2004) 
Panel (A)  
Polity measure 
 
 
 Quantiles 
 10th 20th 30th 40th 50th 60th 70th 80th 90th 95th 
GDP 1.154*** 
(27.260) 
1.170*** 
(27.560) 
1.176*** 
(26.581) 
1.173*** 
(26.359) 
1.169*** 
(26.168) 
1.170*** 
(26.069) 
1.167*** 
(25.948) 
1.153*** 
(24.472) 
1.143*** 
(22.091) 
1.139*** 
(20.485) 
TRADE 0.045 
(0.891) 
0.052 
(1.131) 
0.049 
(1.121) 
0.058 
(1.312) 
0.057 
(1.274) 
0.060 
(1.319) 
0.058 
(1.233) 
0.062 
(1.298) 
0.053 
(1.091) 
0.040 
(0.880) 
POP 0.153*** 
(6.859) 
0.134*** 
(6.857) 
0.131*** 
(6.859) 
0.131*** 
(6.654) 
0.130*** 
(6.463) 
0.129*** 
(6.193) 
0.126*** 
(5.885) 
0.119*** 
(5.566) 
0.114*** 
(5.003) 
0.108*** 
(4.668) 
INDUS 0.071 
(0.838) 
0.132 
(1.584) 
0.143* 
(1.874) 
0.138* 
(1.915) 
0.152** 
(2.208) 
0.148** 
(2.170) 
0.150** 
(2.245) 
0.168** 
(2.439) 
0.182** 
(2.360) 
0.206** 
(2.429) 
Kaopen 0.023 
(1.412) 
0.005 
(0.369) 
-0.001 
(-0.110) 
-0.001 
(-0.113) 
-0.003 
(-0.283) 
-0.005 
(-0.395) 
-0.006 
(-0.467) 
-0.001 
(-0.092) 
0.001 
(0.096) 
0.002 
(0.117) 
Polity2 0.017*** 
(3.879) 
0.010*** 
(3.100) 
0.007*** 
(2.715) 
0.005*** 
(2.738) 
0.004** 
(2.257) 
0.003 
(1.542) 
0.002 
(0.847) 
0.001 
(0.235) 
-0.003 
(-0.890) 
-0.011** 
(-2.034) 
Constant -12.662*** 
(-23.064) 
-12.631*** 
(-24.791) 
-12.587*** 
(-25.714) 
-12.526*** 
(-26.544) 
-12.443*** 
(-27.844) 
-12.402*** 
(-28.226) 
-12.254*** 
(-28.022) 
-11.987*** 
(-28.089) 
-11.737*** 
(-26.720) 
-11.535*** 
(-25.784) 
Panel (B)  
Freedom 
House measure 
 
GDP 1.155*** 
(25.111) 
1.168*** 
(27.870) 
1.172*** 
(27.706) 
1.175*** 
(27.683) 
1.175*** 
(28.050) 
1.175*** 
(27.639) 
1.174*** 
(27.536) 
1.169*** 
(27.165) 
1.177*** 
(24.358) 
1.182*** 
(22.856) 
TRADE 0.038 
(0.632) 
0.032 
(0.625) 
0.030 
(0.618) 
0.033 
(0.700) 
0.041 
(0.857) 
0.036 
(0.726) 
0.042 
(0.831) 
0.043 
(0.832) 
0.033 
(0.635) 
0.016 
(0.309) 
POP 0.120*** 
(6.803) 
0.099*** 
(7.134) 
0.093*** 
(8.011) 
0.090*** 
(8.445) 
0.091*** 
(8.637) 
0.087*** 
(8.163) 
0.082*** 
(7.635) 
0.076*** 
(6.884) 
0.069*** 
(5.795) 
0.059*** 
(4.327) 
INDUS 0.113 
(1.172) 
0.192** 
(2.111) 
0.190** 
(2.252) 
0.184** 
(2.338) 
0.181** 
(2.445) 
0.186** 
(2.609) 
0.182*** 
(2.689) 
0.201*** 
(2.818) 
0.190** 
(2.463) 
0.211*** 
(2.648) 
Kaopen 0.011 
(0.642) 
0.002 
(0.179) 
-0.002 
(-0.148) 
-0.005 
(-0.440) 
-0.007 
(-0.584) 
-0.009 
(-0.754) 
-0.011 
(-0.885) 
-0.009 
(-0.661) 
-0.009 
(-0.567) 
-0.008 
(-0.432) 
Freedom 0.028*** 
(3.287) 
0.014** 
(2.196) 
0.010* 
(1.942) 
0.007 
(1.559) 
0.005 
(1.089) 
0.004 
(0.879) 
0.002 
(0.289) 
-0.002 
(-0.345) 
-0.013 
(-1.456) 
-0.024** 
(-2.446) 
Constant -12.483*** 
(-20.982) 
-12.265*** 
(-24.087) 
-12.090*** 
(-25.337) 
-11.978*** 
(-26.733) 
-11.918*** 
(-27.372) 
-11.818*** 
(-27.729) 
-11.647*** 
(-27.642) 
-11.460*** 
(-26.537) 
-11.128*** 
(-25.245) 
-10.840*** 
(-23.408) 
t values in parentheses.* indicate statistical significance at 10%; ** indicate significance at 5% and *** indicate significance at 1%. 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 5 
Robustness analysis: alternative estimation technique based on Canay (2011)  
Panel (A)  
Polity measure 
 
 
 Quantiles 
 10th 20th 30th 40th 50th 60th 70th 80th 90th 95th 
GDP 1.158*** 
(66.034) 
1.161*** 
(60.399) 
1.155*** 
(73.814) 
1.151*** 
(81.499) 
1.148*** 
(80.815) 
1.146*** 
(72.968) 
1.145*** 
(71.572) 
1.135*** 
(70.863) 
1.129*** 
(70.216) 
1.125*** 
(51.819) 
TRADE 0.016 
(0.673) 
0.026 
(0.943) 
0.016 
(0.512) 
0.020 
(0.703) 
0.022 
(0.870) 
0.026 
(0.970) 
0.022 
(0.889) 
0.026 
(0.798) 
0.046 
(1.506) 
0.032 
(0.972) 
POP 0.352*** 
(33.646) 
0.343*** 
(33.142) 
0.335*** 
(35.655) 
0.336*** 
(36.738) 
0.333*** 
(35.654) 
0.334*** 
(39.591) 
0.330*** 
(32.472) 
0.322*** 
(33.120) 
0.323*** 
(30.495) 
0.311*** 
(24.103) 
INDUS -0.020 
(-0.368) 
0.017 
(0.355) 
0.042 
(1.024) 
0.044 
(1.283) 
0.058 
(1.282) 
0.056 
(1.423) 
0.063 
(1.529) 
0.094* 
(1.769) 
0.095 
(1.569) 
0.092* 
(1.742) 
Kaopen 0.006 
(0.590) 
0.002 
(0.173) 
0.004 
(0.415) 
0.004 
(0.385) 
-0.00001 
(-0.001) 
0.0003 
(0.027) 
0.0004 
(0.039) 
0.002 
(0.189) 
0.005 
(0.474) 
0.006 
(0.393) 
Polity2 0.015*** 
(4.324) 
0.009*** 
(3.213) 
0.006*** 
(2.774) 
0.005*** 
(2.626) 
0.005** 
(2.272) 
0.004* 
(1.9052) 
0.002 
(1.028) 
0.0008 
(0.293) 
-0.007** 
(-2.108) 
-0.012*** 
(-2.354) 
Constant -15.399*** 
(-26.883) 
-15.368*** 
(-31.917) 
-15.132*** 
(-40.361) 
-15.116*** 
(-38.857) 
-15.061*** 
(-44.572) 
-14.994*** 
(-45.878) 
-14.882*** 
(-32.250) 
-14.678*** 
(-34.627) 
-14.596*** 
(-37.475) 
-14.213*** 
(-32.620) 
Panel (B)  
Freedom 
House measure 
 
GDP 1.087*** 
(61.774) 
1.099*** 
(54.865) 
1.099*** 
(68.518) 
1.100*** 
(62.359) 
1.103*** 
(61.145) 
1.101*** 
(66.669) 
1.100*** 
(55.404) 
1.096*** 
(51.826) 
1.109*** 
(61.110) 
1.119*** 
(46.392) 
TRADE -0.003 
(-0.095) 
-0.006 
(-0.196) 
-0.010 
(-0.341) 
-0.003 
(-0.106) 
-0.003 
(-0.1) 
-0.0009 
(-0.032) 
0.005 
(0.168) 
0.002 
(0.054) 
0.011 
(0.375) 
0.010 
(0.301) 
POP 0.067*** 
(5.371) 
0.051*** 
(5.473) 
0.042*** 
(4.892) 
0.041*** 
(4.644) 
0.038*** 
(4.219) 
0.035*** 
(4.611) 
0.032*** 
(3.999) 
0.024*** 
(2.492) 
0.019* 
(1.931) 
0.012 
(1.143) 
INDUS 0.078 
(1.478) 
0.106** 
(2.042) 
0.112** 
(2.243) 
0.115*** 
(2.806) 
0.106** 
(2.199) 
0.113*** 
(2.778) 
0.123** 
(2.546) 
0.141*** 
(2.767) 
0.132*** 
(2.764) 
0.129** 
(2.015) 
Kaopen 0.002 
(0.223) 
-0.004 
(-0.289) 
-0.003 
(-0.301) 
-0.006 
(-0.599) 
-0.009 
(-0.846) 
-0.009 
(-0.911) 
-0.013 
(-1.096) 
-0.011 
(-0.898) 
-0.008 
(-0.807) 
-0.010 
(-0.677) 
Freedom 0.025*** 
(3.760) 
0.015*** 
(2.936) 
0.009** 
(2.235) 
0.007* 
(1.814) 
0.006 
(1.245) 
0.004 
(0.935) 
0.003 
(0.699) 
-0.001 
(-0.166) 
-0.017** 
(-2.362) 
-0.029*** 
(-3.236) 
Constant -10.695*** 
(-23.020) 
-10.488*** 
(-25.315) 
-10.195*** 
(-22.489) 
-10.164*** 
(-26.900) 
-10.006*** 
(-28.013) 
-9.979*** 
(-27.365) 
-9.889*** 
(-25.818) 
-9.633*** 
(-16.445) 
-9.391*** 
(-21.268) 
-9.190*** 
(-17.615) 
t values in parentheses.* indicate statistical significance at 10%; ** indicate significance at 5% and *** indicate significance at 1%. 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 6 
Robustness analysis: Nonlinear relationship between income and CO2 emissions 
Panel (A)  
Polity measure 
 
 
 Quantiles 
 10th 20th 30th 40th 50th 60th 70th 80th 90th 95th 
GDP 2.840*** 
(4.0825) 
2.785*** 
(4.1550) 
2.732*** 
(4.2563) 
2.674*** 
(4.3174) 
2.631*** 
(4.3593) 
2.6178*** 
(4.3122) 
2.535*** 
(4.0894) 
2.386*** 
(3.8012) 
2.207*** 
(3.3041) 
2.162*** 
(3.1928) 
GDP2 -0.102** 
(-2.5426) 
-0.098** 
(-2.5216) 
-0.095** 
(-2.5460) 
-0.092** 
(-2.5413) 
-0.089** 
(-2.5313) 
-0.088** 
(-2.4914) 
-0.084** 
(-2.3124) 
-0.076** 
(-2.0660) 
-0.066* 
(-1.6946) 
-0.064 
(-1.6212) 
TRADE 0.011 
(0.2020) 
0.029 
(0.5708) 
0.034 
(0.6971) 
0.038 
(0.8012) 
0.040 
(0.8446) 
0.045 
(0.9370) 
0.043 
(0.8902) 
0.047 
(0.9384) 
0.026 
(0.5302) 
0.014 
(0.3138) 
POP 0.173*** 
(7.5453) 
0.159*** 
(7.5156) 
0.158*** 
(7.7039) 
0.158*** 
(7.7499) 
0.155*** 
(7.5863) 
0.157*** 
(7.5354) 
0.152*** 
(7.0860) 
0.146*** 
(6.5142) 
0.135*** 
(5.6902) 
0.129*** 
(5.4379) 
INDUS -0.007 
(-0.095) 
0.043 
(0.5428) 
0.083 
(1.1228) 
0.087 
(1.2095) 
0.108 
(1.5428) 
0.103 
(1.4923) 
0.116 
(1.6352) 
0.162** 
(2.1166) 
0.203** 
(2.002) 
0.265*** 
(2.9017) 
Kaopen 0.028* 
(1.8940) 
0.008 
(0.5973) 
0.003 
(0.2651) 
-0.001 
(-0.0465) 
-0.002 
(-0.2175) 
-0.004 
(-0.3360) 
-0.004 
(-0.3290) 
-0.004 
(-0.2774) 
-0.004 
(-0.2536) 
0.0007 
(0.0421) 
Polity2 0.016*** 
(3.5658) 
0.009*** 
(2.9122) 
0.006** 
(2.6120) 
0.005** 
(2.3539) 
0.004 
(1.6857) 
0.002 
(1.1943) 
0.001 
(0.6207) 
0.0007 
(0.3129) 
-0.004 
(-1.1120) 
-0.013*** 
(-2.7801) 
Constant -19.431*** 
(-6.6269) 
-19.192*** 
(-6.7320) 
-19.006*** 
(-6.9357) 
-18.730*** 
(-7.0845) 
-18.526*** 
(-7.2081) 
-18.449*** 
(-7.1458) 
-17.963*** 
(-6.7947) 
-17.275*** 
(-6.4811) 
-16.243*** 
(-5.8361) 
-15.951*** 
(-5.6120) 
Panel (B)  
Freedom 
House measure 
 
GDP 3.021*** 
(3.8085) 
2.900*** 
(3.8986) 
2.844*** 
(3.9742) 
2.770*** 
(3.9261) 
2.742*** 
(3.9349) 
2.701*** 
(3.8860) 
2.645*** 
(3.7356) 
2.516*** 
(3.5257) 
2.406*** 
(3.2978) 
2.093*** 
(2.8387) 
GDP2 -0.111** 
(-2.4238) 
-0.102** 
(-2.3822) 
-0.098** 
(-2.3781) 
-0.094** 
(-2.3044) 
-0.093** 
(-2.2926) 
-0.090** 
(-2.2356) 
-0.087** 
(-2.1150) 
-0.080* 
(-1.9240) 
-0.074* 
(-1.7332) 
-0.055 
(-1.2717) 
TRADE 0.0002 
(0.0026) 
-0.0004 
(-0.0061) 
0.007 
(0.1321) 
0.008 
(0.1567) 
0.015 
(0.2936) 
0.017 
(0.3336) 
0.014 
(0.2692) 
0.010 
(0.1924) 
0.004 
(0.0726) 
-0.004 
(-0.0828) 
POP 0.121*** 
(5.2397) 
0.102*** 
(5.5584) 
0.098*** 
(6.1498) 
0.095*** 
(6.1973) 
0.094*** 
(6.2337) 
0.093*** 
(6.1164) 
0.086*** 
(5.5810) 
0.078*** 
(4.9541) 
0.071*** 
(4.4233) 
0.059*** 
(3.5705) 
INDUS 0.058 
(0.6222) 
0.111 
(1.2826) 
0.120 
(1.5501) 
0.131* 
(1.7793) 
0.144** 
(2.0110) 
0.136* 
(1.9107) 
0.148** 
(2.0435) 
0.170** 
(2.1993) 
0.184** 
(2.1282) 
0.244*** 
(2.7882) 
Kaopen 0.028* 
(1.7243) 
0.006 
(0.5191) 
-0.0003 
(-0.0251) 
-0.003 
(-0.2992) 
-0.007 
(-0.6699) 
-0.009 
(-0.8376) 
-0.011 
(-0.8853) 
-0.010 
(-0.8279) 
-0.009 
(-0.6295) 
-0.015 
(-0.9444) 
Freedom 0.027*** 
(3.1110) 
0.014** 
(2.0926) 
0.008 
(1.5472) 
0.006 
(1.1327) 
0.004 
(0.8071) 
0.002 
(0.3697) 
-0.001 
(-0.1771) 
-0.004 
(-0.6687) 
-0.014 
(-1.6508) 
-0.026*** 
(-2.7063) 
Constant -19.854*** 
(-5.7622) 
-19.133*** 
(-5.9504) 
-18.797*** 
(-6.0866) 
-18.399*** 
(-6.0429) 
-18.250*** 
(-6.0824) 
-17.989*** 
(-6.0172) 
-17.568*** 
(-5.7956) 
-16.814*** 
(-5.5453) 
-16.105*** 
(-5.2646) 
-14.608*** 
(-4.7098) 
t values in parentheses.* indicate statistical significance at 10%; ** indicate significance at 5% and *** indicate significance at 1%. 
 
 Table 7 
Robustness analysis: alternative values of   (Polity measure) 
Quantile Panel (A)  
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.95 
Polity2 
0.016*** 
(3.490) 
0.009*** 
(2.896) 
0.007*** 
(2.728) 
0.005** 
(2.436) 
0.005** 
(2.411) 
0.003 
(1.631) 
0.002 
(1.041) 
0.002 
(0.704) 
-0.002 
(-0.690) 
-0.009* 
(-1.934) 
 =0.1 
Kaopen 
0.017 
(1.118) 
0.001 
(0.099) 
0.003 
(0.304) 
0.004 
(0.386) 
0.0003 
(0.030) 
-0.001 
(-0.127) 
-0.003 
(-0.230) 
-0.001 
(-0.043) 
0.005 
(0.279) 
0.002 
(0.147) 
Polity2 
0.016*** 
(3.569) 
0.009*** 
(2.751) 
0.006** 
(2.409) 
0.005** 
(2.324) 
0.004** 
(1.998) 
0.003 
(1.445) 
0.002 
(0.870) 
0.001 
(0.463) 
-0.002 
(-0.582) 
-0.009* 
(-1.690) 
 =0.3 
Kaopen 
0.020 
(1.217) 
0.001 
(0.052) 
0.002 
(0.173) 
0.002 
(0.193) 
-0.001 
(-0.113) 
-0.002 
(-0.201) 
-0.003 
(-0.269) 
-0.001 
(-0.072) 
0.003 
(0.210) 
0.005 
(0.319) 
Polity2 
0.015*** 
(3.845) 
0.009*** 
(2.958) 
0.006** 
(2.437) 
0.005** 
(2.499) 
0.004** 
(2.186) 
0.003 
(1.648) 
0.002 
(1.022) 
0.001 
(0.357) 
-0.002 
(-0.693) 
-0.009* 
(-1.705) 
 =0.5 
Kaopen 
0.021 
(1.301) 
0.001 
(0.074) 
0.002 
(0.148) 
0.001 
(0.073) 
-0.002 
(-0.194) 
-0.003 
(-0.263) 
-0.004 
(-0.296) 
-0.003 
(-0.215) 
0.002 
(0.153) 
0.001 
(0.093) 
Polity2 
0.016*** 
(3.947) 
0.009*** 
(2.881) 
0.006** 
(2.484) 
0.005*** 
(2.585) 
0.004** 
(2.157) 
0.003 
(1.645) 
0.002 
(0.973) 
0.001 
(0.338) 
-0.003 
(-0.813) 
-0.009* 
(-1.788) 
 =0.7 
Kaopen 
0.023 
(1.431) 
0.002 
(0.195) 
0.0003 
(0.024) 
-0.0003 
(-0.029) 
-0.003 
(-0.297) 
-0.004 
(-0.369) 
-0.004 
(-0.368) 
-0.001 
(-0.102) 
0.002 
(0.127) 
0.001 
(0.072) 
Polity2 
0.017*** 
(4.023) 
0.010*** 
(2.932) 
0.006** 
(2.383) 
0.005** 
(2.437) 
0.004** 
(2.097) 
0.003 
(1.475) 
0.002 
(0.809) 
0.001 
(0.265) 
-0.003 
(-0.878) 
-0.010** 
(-2.018) 
 =0.9 
Kaopen 
0.023 
(1.565) 
0.004 
(0.336) 
-0.001 
(-0.088) 
-0.001 
(-0.115) 
-0.003 
(-0.255) 
-0.004 
(-0.391) 
-0.006 
(-0.461) 
-0.001 
(-0.059) 
0.003 
(0.176) 
0.001 
(0.067) 
Polity2 
0.017*** 
(3.785) 
0.010*** 
(3.143) 
0.006*** 
(2.567) 
0.005*** 
(2.591) 
0.004** 
(2.220) 
0.003 
(1.573) 
0.002 
(0.783) 
0.0004 
(0.180) 
-0.003 
(-1.123) 
-0.011** 
(-2.139) 
 =1.1 
Kaopen 
0.023 
(1.448) 
0.005 
(0.478) 
-0.002 
(-0.148) 
-0.002 
(-0.205) 
-0.003 
(-0.309) 
-0.004 
(-0.393) 
-0.005 
(-0.471) 
-0.002 
(-0.118) 
0.001 
(0.085) 
0.004 
(0.235) 
Polity2 
0.017*** 
(3.897) 
0.010*** 
(3.237) 
0.006** 
(2.548) 
0.005** 
(2.461) 
0.004 
(1.950) 
0.003 
(1.387) 
0.001 
(0.672) 
0.0003 
(0.129) 
-0.003 
(-0.943) 
-0.011** 
(-2.251) 
 =1.3 
Kaopen 
0.023 
(1.222) 
0.006 
(0.432) 
-0.002 
(-0.155) 
-0.002 
(-0.131) 
-0.003 
(-0.306) 
-0.004 
(-0.314) 
-0.006 
(-0.451) 
-0.001 
(-0.080) 
0.0001 
(0.007) 
0.003 
(0.195) 
Polity2 
0.017*** 
(3.922) 
0.010*** 
(3.076) 
0.007*** 
(2.695) 
0.005** 
(2.443) 
0.004 
(1.936) 
0.003 
(1.404) 
0.001 
(0.594) 
0.0003 
(0.137) 
-0.003 
(-0.970) 
-0.011** 
(-2.348) 
 =1.5 
Kaopen 
0.023 
(1.200) 
0.005 
(0.354) 
-0.001 
(-0.118) 
-0.002 
(-0.190) 
-0.003 
(-0.275) 
-0.003 
(-0.251) 
-0.006 
(-0.471) 
-0.0004 
(-0.027) 
-0.001 
(-0.047) 
0.003 
(0.160) 
t values in parentheses.* indicate statistical significance at 10%; ** indicate significance at 5% and *** indicate significance at 1%. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 8 
Robustness analysis: alternative values of   (Freedom House measure) 
Quantile Panel 
(B) 
 
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.95 
Freedom 
0.026*** 
(3.409) 
0.016** 
(2.470) 
0.011** 
(1.966) 
0.007 
(1.491) 
0.006 
(1.258) 
0.005 
(0.874) 
0.004 
(0.614) 
0.0005 
(0.070) 
-0.010 
(-1.004) 
-0.020* 
(-1.853) 
 =0.1 
Kaopen 
0.005 
(0.318) 
-0.003 
(-0.230) 
-0.002 
(-0.163) 
-0.003 
(-0.280) 
-0.008 
(-0.716) 
-0.010 
(-0.887) 
-0.013 
(-1.120) 
-0.013 
(-0.991) 
-0.013 
(-0.847) 
-0.010 
(-0.611) 
Freedom 
0.027*** 
(3.285) 
0.015** 
(2.316) 
0.011** 
(2.077) 
0.008 
(1.679) 
0.006 
(1.167) 
0.005 
(0.927) 
0.003 
(0.553) 
0.001 
(0.089) 
-0.010 
(-1.077) 
-0.019* 
(-1.862) 
 =0.3 
Kaopen 
0.006 
(0.343) 
-0.001 
(-0.094) 
0.00002 
(0.002) 
-0.002 
(-0.217) 
-0.007 
(-0.704) 
-0.010 
(-1.000) 
-0.012 
(-1.149) 
-0.012 
(-1.011) 
-0.012 
(-0.844) 
-0.012 
(-0.807) 
Freedom 
0.027*** 
(3.338) 
0.015** 
(2.380) 
0.011** 
(2.145) 
0.008 
(1.625) 
0.005 
(1.080) 
0.005 
(0.948) 
0.003 
(0.500) 
-0.0001 
(-0.013) 
-0.009 
(-0.971) 
-0.021* 
(-1.952) 
 =0.5 
Kaopen 
0.009 
(0.596) 
-0.0002 
(-0.018) 
0.0003 
(0.031) 
-0.003 
(-0.281) 
-0.006 
(-0.600) 
-0.010 
(-0.912) 
-0.011 
(-1.020) 
-0.011 
(-0.852) 
-0.009 
(-0.644) 
-0.008 
(-0.528) 
Freedom 
0.027*** 
(3.118) 
0.014** 
(2.262) 
0.010** 
(2.135) 
0.008* 
(1.771) 
0.005 
(1.177) 
0.004 
(0.924) 
0.002 
(0.327) 
-0.002 
(-0.252) 
-0.011 
(-1.181) 
-0.022** 
(-2.235) 
 =0.7 
Kaopen 
0.010 
(0.565) 
-0.0005 
(-0.047) 
-0.001 
(-0.112) 
-0.004 
(-0.346) 
-0.007 
(-0.639) 
-0.010 
(-0.905) 
-0.013 
(-1.101) 
-0.011 
(-0.831) 
-0.009 
(-0.614) 
-0.007 
(-0.409) 
Freedom 
0.028*** 
(3.531) 
0.015** 
(2.196) 
0.010* 
(1.823) 
0.008 
(1.518) 
0.005 
(1.073) 
0.005 
(0.895) 
0.002 
(0.296) 
-0.002 
(-0.227) 
-0.013 
(-1.460) 
-0.024** 
(-2.337) 
 =0.9 
Kaopen 
0.010 
(0.568) 
0.002 
(0.145) 
-0.002 
(-0.161) 
-0.004 
(-0.377) 
-0.007 
(-0.657) 
-0.009 
(-0.863) 
-0.012 
(-1.075) 
-0.010 
(-0.777) 
-0.009 
(-0.561) 
-0.009 
(-0.526) 
Freedom 
0.027*** 
(3.286) 
0.014** 
(2.285) 
0.010* 
(1.885) 
0.007 
(1.519) 
0.005 
(0.990) 
0.004 
(0.773) 
0.001 
(0.238) 
-0.003 
(-0.415) 
-0.013 
(-1.401) 
-0.025*** 
(-2.735) 
 =1.1 
Kaopen 
0.010 
(0.542) 
0.003 
(0.234) 
-0.002 
(-0.158) 
-0.005 
(-0.481) 
-0.006 
(-0.537) 
-0.009 
(-0.783) 
-0.011 
(-0.911) 
-0.009 
(-0.6920 
-0.008 
(-0.510) 
-0.009 
(-0.552) 
Freedom 
0.027*** 
(3.048) 
0.014** 
(2.103) 
0.009 
(1.666) 
0.007 
(1.357) 
0.005 
(0.994) 
0.003 
(0.667) 
0.0008 
(0.155) 
-0.003 
(-0.493) 
-0.014 
(-1.596) 
-0.026*** 
(-2.839) 
 =1.3 
Kaopen 
0.012 
(0.663) 
0.003 
(0.219) 
-0.001 
(-0.134) 
-0.005 
(-0.452) 
-0.006 
(-0.585) 
-0.008 
(-0.771) 
-0.011 
(-0.897) 
-0.009 
(-0.695) 
-0.008 
(-0.486) 
-0.007 
(-0.420) 
Freedom 
0.027*** 
(3.286) 
0.014** 
(2.091) 
0.008 
(1.545) 
0.006 
(1.265) 
0.004 
(0.900) 
0.003 
(0.600) 
0.001 
(0.098) 
-0.004 
(-0.592) 
-0.014 
(-1.510) 
-0.026*** 
(-2.938) 
 =1.5 
Kaopen 
0.014 
(0.739) 
0.001 
(0.101) 
-0.001 
(-0.119) 
-0.005 
(-0.458) 
-0.006 
(-0.573) 
-0.009 
(-0.823) 
-0.011 
(-0.977) 
-0.009 
(-0.847) 
-0.008 
(-0.601) 
-0.010 
(-0.695) 
t values in parentheses.* indicate statistical significance at 10%; ** indicate significance at 5% and *** indicate significance at 1%. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 9 
Robustness alayisis: exclude Kaopen 
Panel (A)  
Polity measure 
 
 
 Quantiles 
 10th 20th 30th 40th 50th 60th 70th 80th 90th 95th 
GDP 1.183*** 
(25.736) 
1.176*** 
(26.093) 
1.177*** 
(26.307) 
1.172*** 
(26.201) 
1.168*** 
(26.143) 
1.167*** 
(26.318) 
1.163*** 
(26.403) 
1.153*** 
(25.257) 
1.147*** 
(23.124) 
1.142*** 
(21.789) 
TRADE 0.051 
(0.865) 
0.058 
(1.160) 
0.052 
(1.116) 
0.061 
(1.283) 
0.061 
(1.270) 
0.064 
(1.290) 
0.056 
(1.101) 
0.065 
(1.260) 
0.060 
(1.200) 
0.044 
(0.954) 
POP 0.153*** 
(6.229) 
0.137*** 
(6.287) 
0.133*** 
(6.258) 
0.132*** 
(6.107) 
0.132*** 
(6.016) 
0.131*** 
(5.886) 
0.127*** 
(5.659) 
0.121*** 
(5.267) 
0.117*** 
(5.035) 
0.110*** 
(4.723) 
INDUS 0.036 
(0.431) 
0.127 
(1.542) 
0.143* 
(1.816) 
0.138* 
(1.857) 
0.150** 
(2.167) 
0.150** 
(2.251) 
0.160** 
(2.430) 
0.166** 
(2.401) 
0.179** 
(2.365) 
0.202*** 
(2.681) 
Kaopen NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Polity2 0.015*** 
(3.490) 
0.010*** 
(2.844) 
0.006** 
(2.418) 
0.005*** 
(2.805) 
0.004** 
(2.154) 
0.003 
(1.510) 
0.001 
(0.618) 
0.0005 
(0.230) 
-0.003 
(-0.747) 
-0.011* 
(-1.895) 
Constant -12.823*** 
(-23.818) 
-12.731*** 
(-25.718) 
-12.626*** 
(-27.854) 
-12.547*** 
(-28.440) 
-12.480*** 
(-29.123) 
-12.416*** 
(-29.859) 
-12.255*** 
(-29.433) 
-12.013*** 
(-29.478) 
-11.832*** 
(-29.087) 
-11.595*** 
(-28.322) 
Panel (B)  
Freedom 
House measure 
 
GDP 1.168*** 
(28.816) 
1.171*** 
(30.070) 
1.172*** 
(29.426) 
1.173*** 
(29.225) 
1.171*** 
(29.479) 
1.169*** 
(29.222) 
1.167*** 
(28.787) 
1.163*** 
(28.031) 
1.170*** 
(25.375) 
1.175*** 
(23.969) 
TRADE 0.044 
(0.748) 
0.043 
(.860) 
0.034 
(0.756) 
0.039 
(0.892) 
0.041 
(0.886) 
0.036 
(0.765) 
0.035 
(0.711) 
0.040 
(0.798) 
0.027 
(0.543) 
0.013 
(0.276) 
POP 0.124*** 
(7.160) 
0.101*** 
(7.982) 
0.093*** 
(8.364) 
0.089*** 
(8.482) 
0.088*** 
(8.698) 
0.086*** 
(8.264) 
0.080*** 
(7.350) 
0.074*** 
(6.911) 
0.066*** 
(5.663) 
0.057*** 
(4.360) 
INDUS 0.094 
(1.059) 
0.174** 
(2.177) 
0.178** 
(2.349) 
0.180*** 
(2.589) 
0.183*** 
(2.819) 
0.188*** 
(3.084) 
0.184*** 
(3.031) 
0.197*** 
(3.184) 
0.193*** 
(2.813) 
0.203*** 
(2.792) 
Kaopen NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Freedom 0.027*** 
(2.940) 
0.015** 
(2.085) 
0.011* 
(1.911) 
0.008 
(1.570) 
0.005 
(1.104) 
0.005 
(0.880) 
0.002 
(0.271) 
-0.002 
(-0.288) 
-0.013 
(-1.497) 
-0.023** 
(-2.415) 
Constant -12.599*** 
(-21.845) 
-12.324*** 
(-25.190) 
-12.067*** 
(-26.115) 
-11.957*** 
(-27.545) 
-11.864*** 
(-28.580) 
-11.754*** 
(-29.729) 
-11.543*** 
(-28.861) 
-11.341*** 
(-28.464) 
-11.011*** 
(-27.243) 
-10.707*** 
(-26.428) 
t values in parentheses.* indicate statistical significance at 10%; ** indicate significance at 5% and *** indicate significance at 1%. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 10 
Robustness alayisis: exclude democracy 
Panel (A)  
Polity measure 
 
 
 Quantiles 
 10th 20th 30th 40th 50th 60th 70th 80th 90th 95th 
GDP 1.176*** 
(23.649) 
1.170*** 
(25.401) 
1.169*** 
(25.209) 
1.159*** 
(24.608) 
1.154*** 
(24.488) 
1.149*** 
(24.596) 
1.145*** 
(24.292) 
1.129*** 
(22.766) 
1.101*** 
(20.269) 
1.072*** 
(18.807) 
TRADE 0.049 
(0.745) 
0.057 
(1.073) 
0.065 
(1.313) 
0.072 
(1.469) 
0.073 
(1.540) 
0.074 
(1.554) 
0.078 
(1.528) 
0.082 
(1.604) 
0.073 
(1.423) 
0.077 
(1.541) 
POP 0.166*** 
(6.533) 
0.146*** 
(7.088) 
0.142*** 
(7.054) 
0.143*** 
(7.034) 
0.142*** 
(6.911) 
0.142*** 
(6.852) 
0.138*** 
(6.499) 
0.132*** 
(5.963) 
0.125*** 
(5.242) 
0.123*** 
(4.591) 
INDUS 0.056 
(0.543) 
0.118 
(1.335) 
0.127 
(1.563) 
0.134* 
(1.743) 
0.141* 
(1.923) 
0.148** 
(2.120) 
0.150** 
(2.113) 
0.182*** 
(2.602) 
0.203** 
(2.495) 
0.248*** 
(2.703) 
Kaopen 0.013 
(0.757) 
0.001 
(0.101) 
-0.004 
(-0.444) 
-0.001 
(-0.111) 
-0.005 
(-0.504) 
-0.005 
(-0.478) 
-0.007 
(-0.729) 
-0.005 
(-0.386) 
-0.004 
(-0.271) 
-0.0006 
(-0.039) 
Polity2 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Constant -13.025*** 
(-19.179) 
-12.831*** 
(-23.173) 
-12.685*** 
(-24.889) 
-12.646*** 
(-25.364) 
-12.525*** 
(-26.121) 
-12.474*** 
(-26.124) 
-12.332*** 
(-25.344) 
-12.116*** 
(-25.200) 
-11.703*** 
(-24.122) 
-11.518*** 
(-23.579) 
Panel (B)  
Freedom 
House measure 
 
GDP 1.199*** 
(29.272) 
1.185*** 
(34.199) 
1.184*** 
(33.555) 
1.178*** 
(33.441) 
1.174*** 
(33.321) 
1.173*** 
(32.949) 
1.167*** 
(32.382) 
1.156*** 
(30.595) 
1.135*** 
(27.437) 
1.108*** 
(25.211) 
TRADE 0.017 
(0.257) 
0.021 
(0.381) 
0.029 
(0.583) 
0.036 
(0.743) 
0.043 
(0.899) 
0.035 
(0.733) 
0.047 
(0.940) 
0.047 
(0.940) 
0.046 
(0.917) 
0.033 
(0.673) 
POP 0.115*** 
(6.117) 
0.096*** 
(7.800) 
0.094*** 
(9.334) 
0.091*** 
(9.635) 
0.091*** 
(9.944) 
0.088*** 
(9.279) 
0.084*** 
(8.612) 
0.080*** 
(7.976) 
0.076*** 
(6.713) 
0.067*** 
(4.494) 
INDUS 0.098 
(1.074) 
0.179** 
(2.352) 
0.179** 
(2.519) 
0.182*** 
(2.818) 
0.188*** 
(3.084) 
0.185*** 
(3.113) 
0.196*** 
(3.293) 
0.212*** 
(3.411) 
0.214*** 
(2.964) 
0.244*** 
(2.820) 
Kaopen 0.008 
(0.403) 
0.001 
(0.055) 
-0.004 
(-0.365) 
-0.005 
(-0.444) 
-0.008 
(-0.737) 
-0.011 
(-1.018) 
-0.013 
(-1.222) 
-0.014 
(-1.251) 
-0.015 
(-1.232) 
-0.009 
(-0.561) 
Freedom NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Constant -12.410*** 
(-18.994) 
-12.190*** 
(-24.274) 
-12.066*** 
(-26.610) 
-11.974*** 
(-27.350) 
-11.918*** 
(-28.400) 
-11.777*** 
(-29.076) 
-11.688*** 
(-28.719) 
-11.499*** 
(-27.693) 
-11.166*** 
(-26.758) 
-10.710*** 
(-25.376) 
t values in parentheses.* indicate statistical significance at 10%; ** indicate significance at 5% and *** indicate significance at 1%. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                    Fig.1 Histogram for CO2 emissions variable, overlaid with a best-fit Gaussian density 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Appendix  A 
List of countries in the sample over the period 1985-2005. 
Algeria, Antigua and Barbuda*, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Barbados*, Belgium, Belize*, Benin, Bhutan, 
Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Burundi, Cameroon, Canda, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, 
Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo , Republic of Congo, Costa Rica, Cote d’Ivoire*, Cypruse+, Denmark, Dominica*, 
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Grenada*, 
Guyana, Honduras, Iceland*, India, Indonesia, Iran Islamic Rep, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, South Korea, Madagascar, 
Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Malta*, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, 
Pakistan, Panama, Philippines, Portugal, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles*, Sierra Leone, Singapore, South Africa, 
Spain, Sri Lanka, St.Lucia*, St.Vincent and the Grenadines*, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, 
Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobagao, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela RB, 
Zanvua. 
* Not included in Polity measure 
 + Not included in Freedom House measure 
 
